PSP-IPΔ22 - PSP 2.0 - Revised Voting Edition

PSP 2.0 - Revised Voting Edition

Following the changes proposed by the community, we suggest the following version of the PSP 2.0 proposal be voted on and potentially implemented.

Compared to the original version, we have implemented the following changes:

  • Increase in fee redistribution claim time and a commitment to explore the possibility of rollups as a method of claiming rewards.
  • Altering the parameters for the Trading ParaBoosts to better accommodate community suggestions of volume and tokens traded
  • Separate Fairdrop discussion into a different proposal that shall be handled after the vote of the current proposal.

Depending on the amount of additional discussion that is left, we would aim to put this proposal to a vote next week!


PSP 2.0 -

Introducing Social Escrow, Fee Redistribution

TL;DR

What is PSP 2.0?

In summary, PSP 2.0 is a complete overhaul of PSP tokenomics. This proposal radically reduces token emissions and rewards users with protocol fees.

The most significant change in this proposal is the introduction of Social Escrow PSP (sePSP), a novel model in DeFi that rewards users who perform actions beneficial for the protocol and DAO growth.

Why are we introducing it?

The main purpose of the PSP token is to scale and govern the ParaSwap protocol. After one year of observation and community feedback, we believe the current system could be improved by addressing its limitations: staking efficiency, liquidity, and sustainable native token emissions.

What are we proposing?

To achieve these changes, PSP 2.0 proposes the following main ideas:

  • Overhaul the PSP Staking system

  • Introduce the Social Escrow and reward boosting system (ParaBoost) to reward users with protocol fees instead of PSP

  • Implement a pilot period in which a Governance Committee will monitor the new system.

  • Propose the creation of vested PSP (vPSP), a one-year linearly locked version of sePSP to be used in future distribution events.


Table of Contents

Staking Mechanisms

sePSP1 - PSP Staking

sePSP2 - Liquidity Pool Staking

Introducing the Migration from sPSP/stkPSP

Fee Redistribution and Epoch Alterations

ParaBoost and Social Escrow

Trading

Making

Token List and Wash Trading Prevention

Pooling

ParAccount

PSP Balance Booster

Referrals

Computing

Emission Strategies

Vested sePSP

Gas Refund Adjustments

Accountability Measures

Governance Committee (GovCo)

PSP 2.0 Pilot

Proposal Procedure Revisions

PSP Participation and Quorum

Migration - PSP 1 Emissions Smoothing

Effective Proposal Changes


Staking Mechanisms:

The actual PSP staking system has turned out to be capital inefficient as signaling and switching stakes between market makers carry a significant opportunity cost with little upside. Due to the long switching times, we noticed a lower engagement rate from users and market makers within the last six months, leading to its underperformance.

Because of this, we propose the migration towards a new PSP staking system that seeks to maximize the utility of the PSP provided while offering a better staking experience.

We propose to give users two different forms of staking:

image

sePSP1 - PSP Staking

Single-sided staking of PSP: the most basic form of staking for those who do not want to risk impermanent loss from asset pooling. Each PSP staked in se PSP will count as 1 voting power.

We suggest a cooldown period of 1 epoch (4 weeks) for this staking.

In the future, this single-sided token staking option could facilitate the integration of sePSP into other DeFi ecosystems.

sePSP2 - Liquidity Pool Staking

Staking Balancer’s PSP/ETH 80-20 BPT: as previously discussed in the community forums, this option incentivizes the growth of PSP liquidity.

To encourage the staking of sePSP2, we propose a cooldown period of 1 epoch and a 2.5x boost on the value of the PSP staked, meaning a 2x valuation of the total value of the BPT compared to sePSP1. This boost will apply to both ParaBoosts and Voting Power.

Introducing the migration from sPSP/stkPSP

The process will work as follows:

  1. Deposit either sPSP or stkPSP

  2. Choose if you want to stake PSP only or 80-20 BPT.

a) If you choose to stake the 80-20 BPT, you’ll be invited to deposit 20% of (w)ETH, or the LP token, to the staking contract, and you’ll receive sePSP2.

b) If you choose to stake PSP only, you’ll immediately receive sePSP1 representing your new stake.

To encourage migration towards sePSP2, existing stakers could be eligible for a 6-epoch ParaBoost of 20% on their new stake once they complete the migration to sePSP2, as well as a one-time 100% gas refund for migration if they migrate during the first two epochs. Once the migration starts, sPSP depositing will be paused.

Additionally, to remove the uncertainty of PMMs during this transition period, we propose to ‘smooth’ the yield from each sPSP pool. To do this, we will detach rewards based on the market maker’s performance and replace them with a flat emission of PSP equally distributed among all sPSP pools. Read the section ‘ Migration - PSP 1 Emissions Smoothing’ for more information about this process.

Once the migration system is live, all PSP1 rewards will be stopped, and sPSP cooldowns will be changed to make the sPSP easily migrate. A similar cooldown alteration will be given to the stkPSP token used for the ParaSwap Safety Module.


Fee redistribution and epoch alterations

Currently, the ParaSwap protocol accumulates fees under the DAO’s control. This proposal aims to distribute these fees among sePSP system participants. Starting from the day PSP 2.0 begins (more details below), we propose to distribute 80% of the protocol fees to stakers and 20% to the DAO treasury, which will be used for future DAO development.

These fees from all the chains ParaSwap is deployed on will be distributed every epoch in the gas token of each network where staking is available (such as ETH now and in the future MATIC, AVAX, etc.)

Fees will become claimable by users after a grace period of 1 week to ensure the distribution is accurate and will have to be claimed within the following three epochs; otherwise, they will go back to the DAO treasury. This claim function will be available from the staking chain at release, with the potential of claiming from other sources being proposed in the future.

An automatic smart contract solution for fee distribution could be developed in detail in a separate proposal.

As for the fees accumulated before this period, we propose they be claimed by the ParaSwap Foundation and used to support the protocol growth & development as initially planned. This Zapper tracker contains the wallets that accumulated fees until the Fee Claimer module launch on June 13th; no fees have been claimed or sold by the foundation to date. This dashboard contains some useful YTD (Jan-Sep 2022) numbers and covers both fees & revenue.

Finally, In addition to the changes to fee redistribution, the epoch cycle length will also change to 4 weeks instead of 2 weeks. This will help users accomplish the numbers set out by the ParaBoost easier.


ParaBoost and Social Escrow

Introducing the concepts of Social Escrow and Individual Boosting

Social Escrow PSP (sePSP) is a novel system designed to allocate the accumulated protocol fees to the users that produce the most positive externalities for the protocol by performing specific actions.

By introducing the Social Escrow concept, the ParaSwap DAO would have an adaptable and modular system capable of rewarding activities that benefit the protocol at any moment. This additional dimension of escrow provides a higher capital efficiency than the standard model, which only considers time.

All in all, stakers that perform some or all actions considered as boosts by the ParaSwap protocol will increase their ParaBoost score and hence get a bigger share of the protocol fee distribution.

Below are some actions we propose to consider for the initial release of sePSP:

Trading

Trading will be a major booster for the escrow system: the more volume a user brings to the ParaSwap Protocol, the bigger the boost. Volume is a major indicator of protocol health, thus creating a positive externality by performing trades on the protocol.

image

For stablecoin to stablecoin trades, we propose the following boosts:

image

Making

Makers, including limit orders participants, OTC, and RFQ (PMMs), are eligible for stake boost depending on filled orders volume. They also provide health to the protocol without doing direct spot trading. This is valid for both tokens and ERC20 <> NFT trades.

image

ParaSwap Accounts

Accounts are a way for users to link multiple wallets for different purposes:

  • 1 wallet for Trading.

  • 1 wallet for Staking.

  • 1 wallet for Making Markets.

These accounts aim to address the need for separation of concerns from various community members that raised it.

Important: Interactions between those wallets won’t add any boost from each other.

Token Lists and Wash Trading Prevention

To make Trading & Making a healthy process for the protocol, we propose to count the fees generated by this allowlist. The list will be hosted in IPFS and can be updated through an issue and an Express Snapshot vote.

Strict anti-wash trading rules will be applied, including token allowlists and exclusion lists to classify trading pairs eligible for ParaBoost. Additionally, a separate list for stablecoin to stablecoin trades could be curated, in which trading pairs will be eligible but receive a lower boost to prevent abuse.,

In addition to stablecoin to stablecoin list, we propose excluding the same address for referrals, makers & takers, studying the connection between addresses (sybils), and reporting on any pattern indicating wash trading. Any community member will be invited to submit an issue to add a token here or report a wash-trade case on Snapshot.

Pooling

In addition to receiving boosted voting power for the sePSP2 token, we want to foster a long and stable user liquidity provision system without forcing very long-term locking of the assets. This gives the DAO flexibility in adjusting incentives in the long-term while also giving users more flexibility.

On top of the x2 power of sePSP2, we propose the following boosters for the amount of time an asset is kept without requesting a withdrawal:

image

To incentivize significant liquidity and avoid dusting attacks, we suggest a minimum amount of 10k sePSP2 amount for it to be counted for the boost. The boost will be calculated using averages of the stake, and triggering an unstake request will reset the boost timer.

PSP Balance Booster

To reward DAO members who chose not to stake all their PSP or hold some on other chains, we propose adding a small boost of up to 10% by holding a minimum of 100$ worth of PSP in the user’s wallet on a single chain.

Referrals

We consider referrals a fundamental system to reward members of the community, as well as let people support other ParaSwappers directly. For that reason, we propose that all volume generated by referrals provides a 20% boost for the referrer. Additionally, all referees will get a 10% boost to the volume done using a referral.

Computing sePSP

The formula:

Where:

  • sePSP1: Amount of PSP staked in sePSP1

  • sePSP2: Value staked in PSP on the Balancer Pool

Where the ParaBoost is reset to the initial value (PSP Staked) every epoch.

Example:

A user stakes 100k PSP, trades $100M and brings $100M volume through referrals.

ParaBoost = 100k *1.6 * 1.2 = 192k, equivalent to staking 192k PSP.


Emission Strategies

As PSP 2.0 drastically reduces native token emissions, we propose distributing PSP only for specific initiatives contributing to the protocol growth and usage.

Vested sePSP

For all future distributions, we propose the creation of a vested PSP token, similar to previous vesting methods in DeFi. This non-transferable token would be vested towards PSP for a certain period but still carry the benefits of sePSP, such as voting power and boost eligibility.

If the vPSP is not claimed within three epoch, it will be claimed back to the treasury.

Gas refund adjustments

Following its success, we propose to align the Gas Refund Program with PSP 2.0 by introducing the following changes:

  • Consider ParaBoost score instead of staked PSP amount.

  • Pause the virtual lockup system during the implementation of PSP 2.0. This is to avoid users being unable to use the gas refund for one week after doing the migration. The Virtual Lockup can be re-enabled in the future at the discretion of the Governance Committee.

  • Doubling of the per-epoch limit from the current $1.25k USD limit to $2.5k , to account for the lengthened epochs.

  • Limit the refund to 95% instead of 100% to avoid system gaming.

One challenge we can see from incorporating ParaBoosts is that the number will fluctuate much more than the previous staking levels. If we stay with discrete gas refund levels, similar ParaBoost Scores could result in very different refunds, slightly above or below the threshold.

To solve this, we propose to adopt a proposal from DAO member Bach. We have reached out to him to hear potential feedback on best adapting this to the ParaBoost system. An adjustment is made to the reward calculation formula to make it continuous rather than discrete. To take into account the new ParaBoost system, our current proposed formula is:

ABS(0.126506 * LN( 0.335487* [Total PSP Stake Value]+ 1.64295 )- 0.789135)

With this formula, the approximate values (after taking into account, for example, the 2x boost of sePSP2 and the ParaBoost) would be:

image

*The terms can be revisited depending on the PSP spot price.

For consistency across an epoch, the final ParaBoost score will be applied to the stake level at the end of the epoch. A more granular system of gas refunds could be explored once the core functionalities of PSP 2.0 are implemented.


Accountability Measures

Governance committee (GovCo):

A committee composed of 5 members: from the core team, other DAOs, and the ParaSwap DAO. GovCo will govern the PSP 2.0 reward system and ensure it’s fair and unbiased.

On-chain data and rewards performance will be monitored to ensure everything is done fairly. The committee members will be elected and approved by the DAO for a six-month (6 epochs) term. A separate proposal should be submitted.

A separate proposal with the final list of GovCo members will be published shortly before the 6 Epoch initial period for PSP 2.0

PSP 2.0 Pilot:

The first six epochs of the implementation of the system will be considered a pilot period to assess the effectiveness of the solutions implemented. During this period, the incentives and weights of the boosts can be adjusted if needed, requiring a DAO vote.

The six-month pilot period will have bi-epoch checkpoints where the Governance Committee will discuss PSP 2.0 implementation updates and potential improvements.

Additionally, another call will be set up at the end of each epoch to provide updates on the performance of the points outlined during the last checkpoint.

For both people within and outside GovCo, dashboards will be built for real-time tracking data of PSP 2.0.


Proposal Procedure Revisions

PSP Participation and Quorum Alterations

The initial participation and quorum proposals established in PSP-IP6 were made, considering the PSP1 method of emissions and governance. Considering how we will be altering the PSP staking and emission systems, we propose the following changes to governance:

  • Change the tokens being used for voting to sePSP and sePSP2

  • Change the minimum amount of PSP needed for a proposal to 10.000 PSP, to account for the 2x boost given from sePSP2

  • Change the amount of PSP required for Quorum for PSP-IP proposals to 4M, as the current % of circulating supply will be more difficult to calculate with the altered emissions model.


PSP- EP Introduction of an Express Proposal Framework-

In the original PSP-IP proposal framework, there is a minimum voting period of 5 days on Snapshot to implement a proposal (see PSP-IP6). When combining this with other steps of governance, such as discord and forum discussion, a proposal can easily take three weeks from the initial proposal stage to its final implementation.

Considering the importance of timing in certain situations, we propose introducing a new type of proposal to prepare the ParaSwap DAO for any potential rapid action that might have to be done. This proposed framework will also help respond to other emergencies related to PSP.

For a proposal to be an Express Proposal, it has about one of the following:

  • Mitigating any vulnerabilities that might trigger system abuse related to PSP

  • Addressing events that might lead to critically low amounts of PSP liquidity.

  • Responding to outside circumstances that affect the PSP systems, such as partners of the PSP system being compromised.

Compared to the standard PSP-IP system, PSP-EP differs in some key aspects.

  • Reduced pre-proposal discussions: Since an emergency proposal seeks to address some key problems surgically, the amount of time expected for forum/discord communications will be lower. Despite this, clear communications and announcements of a PSP-EP are still compulsory.

  • Expedited voting time: Since these votes tend to be for urgent matters, the new proposed time for PSP-EP would be up to 48 hours as opposed to the usual five days, depending on the urgency of the proposal.

With this system, we expect to introduce a framework for people to readily address any potential DAO vulnerabilities in the future.

To decide the severity of a situation, the PSP-EP will have to be classified under one of the following tiers, which will determine the course of action allowed:

Tier 1
Type: Emergency
Scope: User funds are at risk
Actions: Immediate intervention by pausing the system, then a community discussion + vote for further actions. Only GovCo can pause the contracts and should release a postmortem.

Tier 2
Type: Emergency
Scope: Risk on Revenue takeover (egg: Attack on the revshare by exploiting a loophole on the ParaBoost)
Actions: 24h vote time. If the attack happens 24h before the fee distribution time, the reaction should be immediate and follows the same process as Tier-1. The action should be limited to pausing fee distributions.

Tier 3
Type: Express
Scope: Time-sensitive system improvements/fixes (egg: a bug found on the system that impacts ParaBoost or staking)
Actions: 24h-48h vote time. If the issue is discovered 24h before the fee distribution time, the Tier-1 process applies.

Finally, for the sake of clarity, the following proposals that had to address critical issues will be re-classified as PSP-EPs:

  • Gas refund urgent proposal

  • Emergency Liquidity Proposal

Migration - PSP 1 Emissions Smoothing

As this proposal aims to transition the staking pool away from the Private Market Maker system, we propose altering the staking rewards towards a system that will allow for a stable transition to PSP 2.0 without reliance on PMM performance, reducing risks similar to the ones Pool4 recently experienced.

In this transition system, sPSP pool performance will not depend anymore on Private Market Maker performance. Instead, we propose to cut the emissions for PMMs and distribute a fixed amount of PSP among all pools proportional to the number of stakers in each. This system will allow people to receive a predictable rate for staking, reducing the risks of the sPSP system while we wait for the implementation of PSP 2.0


Effective Proposal Changes

Actions effective immediately after the vote passes.

  • sPSP Emissions Smoothing for Migration: All emissions for PMMs will be stopped. Meanwhile, a maximum of 1.5M PSP/month will be distributed among each sPSP relative to the number of stakers in each pool.

  • Renewal of the Gas Refund Program

  • Introduction of Expedite Proposals

Actions effective after 2.0 Launch

  • Implementation of migration module

  • Epoch length alteration: Extension from 2 weeks to 1 month per individual epoch.

  • sPSP/Safety Module reward cut: The old emissions will be discontinued once the new system goes live

  • sPSP deposits pause: Once the new system is out, no more sPSP depositing will be allowed.

  • Enabling protocol fees reallocation for both previously accrued fees and future ones

  • Voting protocol alternation: Switching from the current tokens to sePSP and sePSP2 as the only voting tokens. sePSP will receive 1 voting power per PSP staked, while sePSP2 will receive the aforementioned 2.5x boost to voting power for the PSP staked in it.

  • sPSP/stkPSP cooldown modifications: The withdrawal times for both systems are to be altered for the transition to 0 for migration purposes.

  • Gas refund adjustments: Altering the Gas Refund levels to make them compatible with the new ParaBoost system


16 Likes

Nice job. Congrats.
A point about urgence vote
The 6-hour deadline seems too tight to me.
24 hours minimum seems to me coherent so that everyone can be alerted and take the right decision.

3 Likes

Great work everyone!

I think this version will be debated of course, but is clearly a really good one. And I hope it will be implemented.
For me, the tokenomics is great.

Separating the fairdrop was necessary.

As @stikers mentionned, 6 hours may seem a bit short (since for example, we could be sleeping the whole 6-hours), but 24 is too much, I would say 10 or 12 hours.

Amazing job!

3 Likes

It’s between 6 and 48h. 6h will means a very urgent change in the system, that should be the extreme exception, not the rule

Yep, but reducing time means reducing democracy. So we’re talking about reducing democracy on the most important decisions (since it is urgent).
My boss always told me a thing : “when it is urgent, it is the perfect moment to take the time to do things right”.

We have to antipate crisis situations. I remember a protocol where a guy created a vote in order to win cash (something about lending and borrowing, sorry I can’t remember) and since he had a major vote power, the proposal was adopted.
In this case, duration was critical.

2 Likes

For the extreme situation, the Governance committee could be responsible to decide the time we have to react. For exemple: extremly urgent 6 hours, really urgent 12 hours, urgent 24 hours. This would help to adapt.

1 Like

I agree that democracy is important.
However, in some situation you have to react fast.
And you can´t wait until the all DAO has voted.

In my opinion the emergency can wait 6 hours so it can wait 12 or 24.

If a contract is vulnerable and a hack can happen, it is not the Dao’s job to choose whether or not the devs should fix that vulnerability.
I think this is the only thing that needs extreme urgency but then 6 hours is too much.

Liquidity issues etc can wait 12/24 hours. Especially as they will affect all token holders.

If I say something stupid. Don’t hesitate for a second to correct me :grin::sunglasses:

By agreeing to 6h one agrees to have every proposal go into “emergency” mode and thus reduce the idea of a real Dao.

We are already aware that few people get involved in the Dao compared to the numbers of holders.
By reducing the timeframe for voting, we will not increase the share of voters and therefore reduce the credibility of the Dao.

Since the launch of psp. How many measures have taken less than 6 hours to decide?

An alternative could be 10 members with the following repartition: 5 that can be reelected and 5 that can´t be reelected. For a six-month term or more? (why so short time?)
Benefit: encourages members to get involved in the DAO and brings more transparency, democracy (as we can assume that it would always be the same 5 people who would be elected)

1 Like

But someone has to take the decision. And someone we all trust. Because any devs ( no offense) could say there is a vulnerabilty, i change the code. This someone could be the Governance committee.

I agree with you that we could make a list of differentissues and offers a waiting time.
For exemple: - vulnerabilty in the contract 6 hours, liquidity issues 24 hours… (i don´t have the skills to make proper offer)

Past performance is no guarantee of future performance, if you know what i mean :wink:

2 Likes

Good points. I don’t think we should blindly trust but we could setup rules for safety. How about setting the scope of the emergency proposals + who can make those ? Scope can be: pausing deposits/trading, updating Boosts if an issue was found… Only GovCo members can submit this kind of proposals to avoid any kind of governance attacks. IMO, pausing should happen immediately if there is a security issue, then post a proposal to have the DAO acceptance. Waiting 6h or 10h to take action while knowing that user fund are being stolen will be a very efficient way to kill ParaSwap :smiley:

Regarding other comments, I completely disagree of brining democracy here, ParaSwap is a DeFi protocol, not a nation state. We need to maximize on safety and performance and nothing else!

3 Likes

Thanks for those ideas. Just to clarify: The staking contracts should be immutable and could only be paused, Limit Orders protocol is 100% immutable, trading can be paused only. The scope idea is great and I agree about immediate intervention if funds are at risk as long as this is limited to temporary pausing and nothing else.

How about this:

Emergency actions by severity:

  1. User funds are at risk: Immediate intervention by pausing the system, then a community discussion + vote for further actions. Only GovCo can pause and should release a postmodern
  2. Risk on Revenue takeover: Attack on the revshare by exploiting a loophole on the ParaBoost score: >= 6 hours intervention. If the attack happens within 6h of the fee distribution time, the reaction should be immediate and follows the same process as 1. The action should be limited to pausing fee distributions.
  3. System improvements/fixes: (Tuneups/fixes of paraboosts, smart contract minor updates,…) 24h-48h. We should go for <48h only if there is a necessity, the normal vote time should be 48h.

A forum & Discord post will be always necessary

7 Likes

Very good :+1::+1::+1::+1: in my opinion

I think this is a good proposal. But I would like know if each epoch will be longer ¿Does this mean gas refund will be capped to $1.25k per epoch? As a member with a large stake I as many other I know in my situations use the protocol due to this incentive and the high daily volume we produce. $2.5K each month is acceptable but this used to be the case when each month had two epochs. I would appreciate this is taken in consideration, as you may know one of Paraswap’s biggest competitor has this incentive as well and is key for actors that produce constant high volume.

4 Likes

This is a very good point! To account for this, I think it would make sense to also double the per epoch limit to account for the lengthening of each individual epoch, what do you all think?

1 Like

I am not sure to understand it very well. Could you explain it in a different way? Thank you.

The idea is to double the trading limit from 1.25k per epoch to 2.5k , that way the limit during one 4 week epoch is the same as that of two two-week epochs ( 1.25k + 1.25k). This means that in practical terms , the limit will stay the same despite longer epoch times :grin:

4 Likes

I think this is a good idea. :ok_hand:

1 Like

Yes! this is exactly what I think would work. Hope everyone else agrees.

1 Like

Thanks guys for the feedback! We discussed with various community members and came to the idea of a tier-based system for express/emergency proposals :

Tier 1
Type: Emergency
Scope: User funds are at risk
Actions: Immediate intervention by pausing the system, then a community discussion + vote for further actions. Only GovCo can pause the contracts and should release a postmortem.

Tier 2
Type: Emergency
Scope: Risk on Revenue takeover (egg: Attack on the revshare by exploiting a loophole on the ParaBoost)
Actions: 24h vote time. If the attack happens 24h before the fee distribution time, the reaction should be immediate and follows the same process as Tier-1. The action should be limited to pausing fee distributions.

Tier 3
Type: Express
Scope: Time-sensitive system improvements/fixes (egg: a bug found on the system that impacts ParaBoost or staking)
Actions: 24h-48h vote time. If the issue is discovered 24h before the fee distribution time, the Tier-1 process applies.

In all cases, only GovCo can pause the contracts, submit the vote, and should always release a postmortem.

4 Likes