Proposal Number & Name
PEP - [EXPRESS VOTE] Return $USDC fees from exploit to GMBL Computer team
Abstract
On Sep-05-2023 at approximately 11:00 PM +UTC, the GMBL.Computer house contract was exploited and 8.1 million $GMBL tokens were stolen.
The exploiter swapped these funds through ParaSwap in four different trasnactions and did not account for surplus, resulting in the following fees being generated and sent to the ParaSwap Fee Claimer contract (50% for ParaSwap DAO and 50% for the partner):
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tx1: 198.223716 USDC surplus
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tx2: 243,631.169124 USDC surplus
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tx3: none
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tx4: none
As ParaSwap fee flow is automatized, the resulting 121,914.696 USDC [(198.223716 + 243,631.169124) / 2] were swapped to 74.77379771 ETH in this transaction Arbitrum Transaction Hash (Txhash) Details | Arbiscan
We are looking to recover the funds that were sent as fees, so we can return them to our LP and make our investors whole.
How was this exploit even possible?
At first glance, we understand this looks suspicious. Even peckshield at first assumed this was a private key leak, but it is not. Access to the server where the private key that controls the withdrawals is highly restricted, and no one with access was compromised.
So, how was this possible?
To understand this, you have to first understand our referral system. If i refer a user, and they place a bet, I am able to claim 5% of their losses, available instantly through our platform in our native $GMBL token and added to your in-game balance.
The user was able to place âghost betsâ, where the server was registering their bets of enormous size [multiple millions of $GMBL] - and since the bets were being registered and could not be won [because they were fake bets] they were automatically registered as losses.
The exploiter could then withdraw these funds through the wallet that referred them.
What did we do in response?
Before launching, all our contracts were audited by Halborn.
We were able to pause the contract from deposits and withdrawals once we knew an exploit was underway, and we paused the game as well.
Shortly after the exploit, our community was able to find the user who did the exploit, because the exploit was unsophisticated and unplanned - the wallet they used was extremely doxxed. This person had reported bugs to us during our beta, and was given whitelist for our presale in return for his services. But this also meant, in hindsight, he was familiar with our backend routes through which he was able to conduct the exploit. We were able to contact the exploiter immediately, we put together a war room with very legitimate people in the crypto space who helped us navigate the situation. All of the above can be seen on our Twitter
We prioritized recovering whatever the exploiter offered to recover something, and are now pursuing legal action against the exploiter for the remainder as he refuses to send us back any more, keeping 50% as a white hat despite the industry norm of 10% which we are happy to give.
Current situation
The GMBL/USDC Camelot LP still has approximately 900k USDC in liquidity, and approximately 400k USDC has been recovered from the exploiter. Negotiations are ongoing for the remainder of the exploit, but the GMBL team will likely have to pursue legal action as the exploiter is no longer cooperating.
Speed is critical in this proposal, as we would like to re-launch the platform with as much of the original liquidity as possible for the users affected by the exploit.
Our platform runs on the GMBL token, so without all the liquidity we can recover back, we are forced to delay a re-launch.
Goals & review
The goal of this proposal is to recover the funds sent to ParaSwap in form of surplus that were the result of the GMBL exploit, which will go right back into the GMBL/USDC LP.
The funds were 121,914.696 USDC originally and later converted into 74.77379771 ETH
ParaSwap did itâs job in this situation, and has no responsibility to return any funds. The only reason we ask for a return of the funds is because it directly impacts our users, who have invested over 2.3 million in our protocol and were the most affected by this exploit.
If we can recover all or part of the funds, we will get one step closer to fulfilling our responsibility to our community and investors.
Voting time
Due to the urgency of the situation, we ask for an express vote of 72 hours instead of the typical 5 days
Voting Options
- For
- Abstain
- Against
Thank you,
The GMBL Computer team