In my opinion the emergency can wait 6 hours so it can wait 12 or 24.
If a contract is vulnerable and a hack can happen, it is not the Dao’s job to choose whether or not the devs should fix that vulnerability.
I think this is the only thing that needs extreme urgency but then 6 hours is too much.
Liquidity issues etc can wait 12/24 hours. Especially as they will affect all token holders.
If I say something stupid. Don’t hesitate for a second to correct me
By agreeing to 6h one agrees to have every proposal go into “emergency” mode and thus reduce the idea of a real Dao.
We are already aware that few people get involved in the Dao compared to the numbers of holders.
By reducing the timeframe for voting, we will not increase the share of voters and therefore reduce the credibility of the Dao.
Since the launch of psp. How many measures have taken less than 6 hours to decide?
An alternative could be 10 members with the following repartition: 5 that can be reelected and 5 that can´t be reelected. For a six-month term or more? (why so short time?)
Benefit: encourages members to get involved in the DAO and brings more transparency, democracy (as we can assume that it would always be the same 5 people who would be elected)
But someone has to take the decision. And someone we all trust. Because any devs ( no offense) could say there is a vulnerabilty, i change the code. This someone could be the Governance committee.
I agree with you that we could make a list of differentissues and offers a waiting time.
For exemple: - vulnerabilty in the contract 6 hours, liquidity issues 24 hours… (i don´t have the skills to make proper offer)
Past performance is no guarantee of future performance, if you know what i mean
Good points. I don’t think we should blindly trust but we could setup rules for safety. How about setting the scope of the emergency proposals + who can make those ? Scope can be: pausing deposits/trading, updating Boosts if an issue was found… Only GovCo members can submit this kind of proposals to avoid any kind of governance attacks. IMO, pausing should happen immediately if there is a security issue, then post a proposal to have the DAO acceptance. Waiting 6h or 10h to take action while knowing that user fund are being stolen will be a very efficient way to kill ParaSwap
Regarding other comments, I completely disagree of brining democracy here, ParaSwap is a DeFi protocol, not a nation state. We need to maximize on safety and performance and nothing else!
Thanks for those ideas. Just to clarify: The staking contracts should be immutable and could only be paused, Limit Orders protocol is 100% immutable, trading can be paused only. The scope idea is great and I agree about immediate intervention if funds are at risk as long as this is limited to temporary pausing and nothing else.
How about this:
Emergency actions by severity:
- User funds are at risk: Immediate intervention by pausing the system, then a community discussion + vote for further actions. Only GovCo can pause and should release a postmodern
- Risk on Revenue takeover: Attack on the revshare by exploiting a loophole on the ParaBoost score: >= 6 hours intervention. If the attack happens within 6h of the fee distribution time, the reaction should be immediate and follows the same process as 1. The action should be limited to pausing fee distributions.
- System improvements/fixes: (Tuneups/fixes of paraboosts, smart contract minor updates,…) 24h-48h. We should go for <48h only if there is a necessity, the normal vote time should be 48h.
A forum & Discord post will be always necessary
I think this is a good proposal. But I would like know if each epoch will be longer ¿Does this mean gas refund will be capped to $1.25k per epoch? As a member with a large stake I as many other I know in my situations use the protocol due to this incentive and the high daily volume we produce. $2.5K each month is acceptable but this used to be the case when each month had two epochs. I would appreciate this is taken in consideration, as you may know one of Paraswap’s biggest competitor has this incentive as well and is key for actors that produce constant high volume.
This is a very good point! To account for this, I think it would make sense to also double the per epoch limit to account for the lengthening of each individual epoch, what do you all think?
I am not sure to understand it very well. Could you explain it in a different way? Thank you.
The idea is to double the trading limit from 1.25k per epoch to 2.5k , that way the limit during one 4 week epoch is the same as that of two two-week epochs ( 1.25k + 1.25k). This means that in practical terms , the limit will stay the same despite longer epoch times
I think this is a good idea.
Yes! this is exactly what I think would work. Hope everyone else agrees.
Thanks guys for the feedback! We discussed with various community members and came to the idea of a tier-based system for express/emergency proposals :
Scope: User funds are at risk
Actions: Immediate intervention by pausing the system, then a community discussion + vote for further actions. Only GovCo can pause the contracts and should release a postmortem.
Scope: Risk on Revenue takeover (egg: Attack on the revshare by exploiting a loophole on the ParaBoost)
Actions: 24h vote time. If the attack happens 24h before the fee distribution time, the reaction should be immediate and follows the same process as Tier-1. The action should be limited to pausing fee distributions.
Scope: Time-sensitive system improvements/fixes (egg: a bug found on the system that impacts ParaBoost or staking)
Actions: 24h-48h vote time. If the issue is discovered 24h before the fee distribution time, the Tier-1 process applies.
In all cases, only GovCo can pause the contracts, submit the vote, and should always release a postmortem.
people who staked from past will receive a boost or it will be from beginning for all stakers ?
Great project. To the moon !!!
Following all the feedback provided by the community, I will add these final minor changes before the vote, which should be ready in snapshot in a couple of days. Thank you everyone for the amazing input both here and other channels
Here’s the proposed final adjustments:
Altering of PSP-EP procedure: Introducing ‘tiers’ to better clarify the levels of urgency and minimise protocol risk
Gas Refund Alterations: Doubling of the per-epoch limit to account for longer epochs. We’re also prosing changes regarding virtual lockup to account for user migration between tokens.
Thank you everyone for these suggestions!
About this one:
To encourage migration towards sePSP2, existing stakers could be eligible for a 6-epoch ParaBoost of 20% on their new stake once they complete the migration to sePSP2
Am I right to assume this would also apply to existing Safety Module stakers moving to sePSP2?
Also, will people that were staking in the safety module before the new contract benefit from an extra ParaBoost for up to 6 epochs prior to release?
Hello, TokenBrice here putting his procedure-reminder hat
- I think it’s a critical violation of standard governance processes to establish both a new proposal format and an actual proposal within the same post: it should be have been split.
- The proposal presented above is also not compliant with the PSP-IP framework: even if it comes from the team, I do not care: there is no special status when it comes to governance.
The proposal passed already anyway, and I woke up too late, but as a (now) remote participant of this governance, I felt the need to raise the flag and call for a much better enforcement of the governance procedures.
Again, just talking about governance procedures here, else I’m glad to see ParaSwap moving toward a new token model.
Hey, thanks for the suggestions,
I’ve added the PSP-IPΔ number , and a separate document for the PSP-EP will soon follow now that the vote has passed.
Regarding having to follow the PSP-IP framework, the proposal has been in development for months now and followed the essential steps outlined of research → clear communication changes in public → publishing the final proposal → incorporating community suggestions, and even an all-time high in community participation, including the greatest amount of contributors from both within ParaSwap and other protocols we’ve ever had.
With the proposal number being added, all key sections of the PSP-IP framework are there : A simple summary, the context, the goals, the means, a rationale, a clear outline of steps that will be implemented immediately after the vote as well as once PSP 2.0 passes. As previously explained here, this proposal is quite different from previous ones as it has an unprecedented level of complexity and atomicity between each of the complex steps. Because of this, trying to make it fit under the usual PSP-IP guideline sections would’ve just made the proposal even more challenging to read.
As you mentioned, the vote is over now, which means it’s too late to add a clarification, but it’s clear that there is a social consensus to proceed with this vote. PSP-IP22 has received 31 M PSP in favour, representing an ATH in voting in favour as of the time of writing! We cannot ignore the Layer 0 of social consensus, that is the most important part of any DAO
basically, when are we going to swap to psp 2.0? do i need to to something in between the change?if my psp are staked shall i leave those there?
and how about the protocol fees? if i don’t withdraw them in time i will lose it? now it is worthless because chain is not overwhelmed and doesn’t cost that much every transaction, but in the future? if i want to wait 2 or 3 epoch before to collect my fees in order to make that economically smart?