PSP-IPΔ13: Gas refund for Stakers

Totally agree about these 4 restrictions, it will help a lot to spot bots/cheaters

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Just wanted to say thank you to the community
I’m new in DAO and it’s wonderful to see how that works, I’m learning a lot because of you guys :man_teacher: !
Hopefully I’ll be able to participate more within the next few months.

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Love the idea of delegation, this will add a lot of value and make effective use of staking.

We can imagine some kind of a marketplace where stakers will rent their staking power in exchange for reward sharing…

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Makes total sens. I thought about a total budget not a yearly, we can definitely set an initial budget for limited duration (3 months for instance), which will allow us to evaluate and iterate on the model.

The limits are a great approach

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Yeah great proposal !

I agree to make some limits to avoid bot to abuse of rewards

I’m brand new here, but this sounds great! Interestingly enough, I almost used Paraswap for the first time a couple hours ago, but chose instead to go with another exchange I have used in the past, as just to avoid the gas fee for approving, even before the one for the swap I was going to make. If this proposal was in place, I would have followed through with out a doubt!

I would suggest we should use the veCurve model from curve.fi. This will allow for stakers to lock smaller amount for higher time and enable higher benefits. So instead of locking 5000PSP for 30days to receive 50% rebate, one can stake 2500PSP for 60days. I think the lockup should be at least 60 days. Also for 25% rebate the staked PSP should be higher (Eg 2500PSP).

The system should be limited to users who directly interact with ParaSwap contracts. This will make sure we are only considering the gas costs of the swaps.

I am getting more and more excited about the project !

From a community point of view, I would believe that developing a group based on a diluted distribution of the token (= more holders with less tokens) would lead to a more efficient governance.

If I get the suggested thresholds, isn’t it better to have % being degressively lighter? As an example:

500 PSP staked: 70% gas refund
5,000 PSP staked: 80% gas refund
50,000 PSP staked: 85% gas refund
500,000 PSP staked: 90% gas refund

This would be also nice in term of inclusivity on expensive chains.

I also believe that a 100% may lead to unexpected dangerous scenario (even with predefined conditions as mentioned).

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Renting staking power sounds interesting but it raises a few questions:
A. The Shortfall arbitrage problem.
If I choose to rent my sPSP, then I can’t use the rented capacity for myself to reduce my own fees (otherwise I would borrow it to myself).
So for it to be financially interesting, the fees rebated to the borrower should at least be able to commission my shortfall in fees.

In other words, that would be interesting if

  • I am not an active trader, and/or
  • I am a small staker renting my capacity to a much larger player with better % gas refund.

The problem here is twofold:
1/ When I decide to rent, I must have visibility on my trading activity going forward, and/or
2/ I must know that the borrower will have better usage of my staking capacity than me to be profitable (receive more commission than rebated fees).

If we were to adopt the % gas refund thresholds, I guess the only sPSP that I would rent would be the “unfilled gaps”, e.g. I own 10K sPSP, so eligible to 25% gas refund, and I would rent 5K sPSP that are unproductive.
The problem is that I might have better usage of this unproductive sPSP by transferring them to another address, restake them and benefit from another 30k limit.

B. 30K limit abuse
A user can unstake his PSP to restake them from another address to benefit from more than 30k USD in rebates. But that can be tracked.
What about a renter? By using multiple addresses I can use as much capacity as I want and abuse that 30k limit. So large traders/platforms using paraswap can burn the overall yearly budget if there is enough renting capacity.

C. Double usage
What happens if I decide to undelegate my sPSP in terms of personal budget? Is my rebate capacity burnt for the full year? I think that there should be a lock-up until the end of the budget period.

These are preliminary thoughts and I have spent time thinking about solutions, but I thought it was worth bringing them forward.

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Interesting points! I have some thoughts that we can tune up:

A/ We can use a flash-rent system where the trader will rent the available tokens on a trade-by-trade basis. We can also come up with a trading score that determines the rebate the user will have depending on their on-chain activity over time.

B & C/ This is why locking the sPSP/PSP… is useful, so this won’t be a problem on the staker side. On the trader side, tokens can be vested with a cliff in order to discourage any form of gaming and to also give the DAO an opportunity to spot any abuse.

For token locks, we can also come up with system similar to Curve with boosters

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That flash-rent system is great! It also solves the problem of unused capacity (I borrow X sPSP but never used them).

I integrated it to an idea I had to solve the problems mentioned.

The idea: create renting rights that are gained by staking PSP

How it works:

1/ I gain “rrPSP” by staking my PSP. rrPSP are uncapped and their distribution are a factor of staking duration and number of sPSP held. The more I keep my PSP staked the more rrPSP I earn. The rrPSP are the representation of an ownership in a “Renting Pool”.

2/ Flash-rent of rrPSP at usage. Commissions are based on volume. Based on on-chain activity of the trader (your Trading Score idea), commissions can decrease/increase. The Trading Score determines the amount of rrPSP rented. For large Traders, an Initial Trading Score can be bought in PSP with distribution to the Pool.

3/ The rrPSP rented are burnt after use disabling double usage possibilities(as such sPSP equivalent of rrPSP, to calculate renting capacity, must take into account the renting rights minted minus the sPSP equivalent burnt).

4/ The commissions are in form of PSP and can be claimed by the rrPSP owners.

I think this solutions has the following merits:

A/ Incentivize stakers to keep PSP staked and reduce the circulation (good for price).

B/ Unload stakers with the shortfall arbitrage problem

C/ Incentivize borrowers to use the same address to capitalize on their past activity. If they were to use multiple addresses to bypass the 30K limit, they would have to buy the Initial Trading Score for them to be profitable.

D/ Solve the double usage problem through the burning mechanism.

The remaining question is how to calibrate rrPSP minting to enable sufficient renting capacity while avoiding too much supply, but that can be solved.

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Love this approach! It will be creating a whole new market

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It seems to be a great idea. Hope to get more details about it.

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awesome. I will think of a more precise proposal over the weekend.

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Looking forward to it :fire:

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Hey guys, these are fascinating discussions, and we’re happy to see Paraswap trailblazing again on gas dilemmas !

We couldn’t help but drop by when we saw the mention of flash-renting of “rrPSP” : if it is a path that the Paraswap community wants to explore, we suggest you have a look at the Paladin Protocol and consider using it as the lending infra for this idea.
This would seriously reduce developing cost and we’re totally open to tailor the solution to Paraswap as there is a huge use-case for sPSP stakers to also be able to rent their staking options to market makers and other actors of the DAO.

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Very interesting discussions. I’m learning all the days thanks to all of you

I had a thought, if we want to adopt the curve gauge mechanics couldn’t we instead have the weights of rewards given to PMM be decided dynamically or through a gauge vote the way CRV/CVX does? This would be interesting and as we open up more market makers we could see a bribe type mechanic develop.

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  1. I assume there would be no time limit on claiming refunds?
  2. Where should the claiming occur? Don’t see a point in forcing people to claim on L1, tbh.